r/IndianDefense • • 19h ago

Article/Analysis Landing on a glacier at 20,000 FT

14 Upvotes

Incidentally, I read a blogpost by a RAF pilot on his experience with this machine and the pilots that fly them and then saw another thread on the Cheetah on this Reddit.

So, sharing this with y’all. Hope you find it as interesting as I did:

https://luckyaviator.wordpress.com/2020/04/29/behind-the-drag-curve-anecdotes-from-an-aviation-career/


r/IndianDefense • • 19d ago

Discussion/Opinions Monthly Thread - November, 2026

26 Upvotes

Guidelines:

  • Be curious, non-judgmental, polite and civil
  • Swearing, foul imagery, slurs are not allowed
  • Do not start fights with other commenters and make it personal
  • Do not post screenshots with username and subreddit name visible
  • Do not post NSFW images in comments

Casual off topic ( work, relationships/life drama, tech, travel, movies/tv shows etc ) comments are allowed as long as they are not about religion or politics

Major deviation from above mentioned guidelines will result in removal of comments and warning, multiple warnings will result in ban


r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

Military History The story behind this infamous photo from 9 Para SF's 2000 cross-LoC raid NSFW

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• Upvotes

Back in 2000, after Pakistan tortured an Indian soldier, operatives from 9 Para SF reportedly crossed the LoC in a retaliatory raid, wiped out a Pakistani military post, and left this Hindi message written on the wall in blood before returning with the remains.

"Hum hain Shikhari dushman hain shikar, Hinsa ke hum Maalik tum kirayedaar"

anyone have more info on this


r/IndianDefense • • 4h ago

Pics/Videos MiG-21 Bison poses for a picture during its service with the IAF.

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42 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 3h ago

Discussion/Opinions Indian Navy Destroyers and Frigates fleet.

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38 Upvotes

Since there is a lot of talk about Indian Navy buying New FFM/upgraded Mogami-class frigates even though there is no AoN or RFI/EOI so i though it will be better to access Indian Navy plans.

1)Talwar class Frigates- we currently have 8 Talwar class frigates in active service and 2 more under trials before entering service in 2027/28. The First batch Included 3 ships which enter into service during 2003/4 where in batch 2, 3 more ships enter service during 2012/13 whereas in Batch 3, 2 more ships enter service during 2024/25. And finally 2 more ships (INS Triput and INS Tavasya) in Batch 4 will enter service during 2026/27/28. So In total 10 Talwar class frigates across 4 batches (INS Talwar,INS Trishul,INS Tabar,INS Teg,INS Tarkash,INS Trikand,INS Tushil,INS Tamal,INS Triput and INS Tavasya), though i think IN will retire INS Talwar,INS Trishul and INS Tabar since they will reach the end of their Service life soon, hence i think in IN plans we will operate 7 Talwar class Frigates (phasing out Batch 1).

2)Shivalik Class Frigates- IN currently operates 3 Frigates of this class (INS Shivalik,INS Satpura and INS Sahyadri) which was inducted during 2010-12. I think IN will continue to operate this in their plans with massive MLU during 2030s?.

3)Brahmaputra class Frigates- IN currently operates 3 Frigates of this class (INS Brahmaputra,INS Betwa,and INS Beas) which was inducted during 2000-2005 . I think IN will retire them since they will reacg their end of their service life soon even though they had their MLU recently.

4)Nilgiri Class Frigates- we currently operate 6 frigate of this class (INS Nilgiri,INS Himgiri,INS Udaygiri,INS Taragiri,INS Dunagiri,and INS Mahendragiri) with 1 more Frigate of this class in Trials(INS Vindhyagiri) which was/will be inducted during 2025-27.

5)New FFM/Upgraded Mogami class frigates- so there is a lot of talks going on ,hence why don't i add 5 frigates of this class.

6)Project 17B Frigates- 7 friagtes of this class (RFP has been issued).

7)Visakhapatnam class Destroyers- we already operate 4 Destroyers of this class (INS Visakhapatnam,INS Mormugao,INS Imphal,and INS Surat) which was inducted during 2021-2025 .

8)Kolkata Class Destroyers- we already operate 3 Destroyers of this class (INS Kolkata,INS Kochi,and INS Chennai) which was inducted during 2014-16.

9)Delhi class Destroyers-we already operate 3 Destroyers of this class (INS Delhi,INS Mysore,and INS Mumbai) which was inducted during 1997-2001 which will be phase out as i don't think they are in IN plans.

10)Rajput class Destroyers-we already operate 3 Destroyers of this class (INS Rana,INS Ranvir,and INS Ranvijay) which was inducted during 1982-1987 and clearly is not in IN plans.

11)Project 15C Destroyers- there was a lot of talks of 4 Destroyers of this class to mitigate risk from NGD with RFP projected in 2027.

12)Project 18/18A NGD - AoN was given just this year(2026) with CCS likely by Fy2028-2029 or Fy2029-2030. Likely will be build in 10 numbers.

In total,21 Destroyers (3 P15A,4 P15B,4 P15C,5 P18 and 5 P18A) and 29 Frigates (3 P17,7 P17A,7 P17B,7 Talwar-class and 5 upgraded Mogami-class).

What do you think of this fleet?


r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

News Drone Supply Chain: Four recent tenders, floated between Sept-Nov through GeM portal -- technical specs indicate parts by brands headquartered or primarily manufacturing in China

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r/IndianDefense • • 14h ago

Interview/Podcast Rahul: The support and encouragement of terrorism by Pak in our country..it is impossible for us to accept our innocent people being murdered and having a conversation with Pak

148 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 17h ago

Pics/Videos Lateef killed, guys chilled.

164 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1h ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Manipur: KCP Militant killed, several others arrested after encounter in Imphal West

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• Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 5h ago

Article/Analysis IAF's Shortage Of Fighters Is The Strongest Case For Theatre Commands

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14 Upvotes

On 16 November, the new Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Ashutosh Dixit, told a national security summit that air power was “the glue” holding jointness, integration, and theatreisation together. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General NS Raja Subramani, India’s senior-most military officer, called integrated theatre commands “an operational imperative.” A theatre command places all army, navy, and air force units on one front under a single commander.

Such warmth from an air chief is new. Since the post of CDS was created in 2019 with a mandate to build these commands, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been the reform’s most persistent sceptic. Dixit’s predecessor, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, spent his last weeks in office restating the case against parcelling out air power, and that case deserves a careful reply.

What the Air Force actually argues

The popular summary, that the IAF cannot divide aircraft it does not have enough of, is close to the truth but incomplete. “The Air Force is not against theatreisation,” Singh told an audience at Air Force Station Kanpur on 22 August, while warning against importing a “pre-baked” foreign model and calling for a graded, step-by-step transition.

What the IAF objects to is permanent geographical division. In an interview on 25 October, Singh said, “We are not viewing theatreisation as an exercise to permanently divide fighter assets geographically.” Air power’s value, he argued, lies in speed, reach, and concentration, and “an aircraft is not relevant only to the geographical area from which it operates.” The guiding principle, in his words, should be “centralised control where necessary, and decentralised execution where appropriate.”

Scarcity gives that doctrine its urgency. At his last annual press conference, on 3 October, Singh said the IAF had 29 fighter squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42. Support aircraft are scarcer still, especially the airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) planes that act as flying radars and the tankers that refuel fighters in mid-air. Divided three ways, the IAF fears, each theatre would be too thin to win its own air battle, and in a war against China and Pakistan at once the country could not mass aircraft where they mattered most.

Beneath the doctrine lies an institutional worry. In July 2021 the first CDS, the late General Bipin Rawat, said the IAF remained “a supporting arm to the armed forces just as the artillery or engineer supports the combatant arms in the Army.” In August 2025, at the Army War College in Mhow, Singh went further, saying “for now, we don’t need any new structure” and proposing instead a joint planning and coordination centre in New Delhi made up of the three service chiefs and the CDS.

These are serious arguments, and some have merit. Air power works best when concentrated rather than scattered along a front in small packets, and Rawat’s “supporting arm” remark understated its independent roles. The conclusion the IAF draws from these premises is much harder to sustain.

Scarcity is the case for a joint commander

Every military has to share its aircraft among competing tasks, and the fewer it has, the more each choice matters. When every sortie counts, someone has to decide whether striking an enemy airbase is worth more than supporting a brigade under pressure in Ladakh, and that is a judgement about the whole campaign rather than the air battle alone.

Under the present system, the IAF plans that campaign largely on its own. The service “virtually fights the air battle in isolation under its chief” and remains “disassociated with the planning” of the land and sea battle, retired Lieutenant General HS Panag, a former head of the Army’s Northern Command, observed in 2021. A shortage of aircraft only raises the price of that separation.

The fear of permanent division rests on a version of theatreisation that its advocates do not propose. Singh himself said the IAF did not see the reform as a permanent division of fighters, and the IAF’s critics agree. “Allocation is not the same as permanent division,” Panag wrote in November, adding that the very idea of permanently tying resources to geographic theatres defied “empirical wisdom and professional comprehension.”

Geographic division is not new to the IAF either. It already runs five operational commands, headquartered in New Delhi, Gandhinagar, Prayagraj, Shillong, and Thiruvananthapuram, each with fighter squadrons based in its own area. ThePrint reported in April, citing unnamed sources, that these commands “already have the assets” and would simply bring them under the theatres. They form part of a patchwork of 17 single-service commands, each reporting to its own service headquarters and responsible for an area that matches no other service’s. Admiral Arun Prakash, a former Chief of the Naval Staff, calls this an “archaic structure” unfit for modern war.

Theatre commands would change who commands the IAF’s squadrons, not where they sit or how air power is run. The squadrons and wings would stay at their present bases and “need not be parcelled out,” Prakash wrote in October. He accepted that the IAF’s fear for its scarce squadrons was legitimate but rejected the conclusion the service draws from it.

Air power would still be controlled centrally and tasked in a decentralised way, as it is now, and the only change is that control would pass from an IAF commander to the theatre commander. To resist theatreisation in the name of air power doctrine, Prakash argued, “confuses the principle itself with the person wielding it.”

Air operations in each theatre would still be run by an airman. Panag would give every theatre a three-star IAF air component commander to plan and direct its air war, and Prakash notes that theatre commanders would take their advice on the use of air power from such an officer.

Assigned aircraft are not frozen in place

The IAF’s deepest worry is that a squadron handed to one theatre would be stuck there while the war moved elsewhere. But assignment to a theatre is an operational order, and orders can be changed. Aircraft would stay at their bases under IAF administration while serving a theatre commander, and “their allocation can be reviewed and modified according to the changing operational situation,” Panag wrote in November. He accepts the IAF’s point that its few combat aircraft must stay available for concentration across fronts rather than being tied to one theatre, and the scheme is built to preserve it.

The IAF has already shown that aircraft can cross command boundaries at speed. In April 2018, during Gagan Shakti, its largest exercise in three decades, the first phase was fought on the western front facing Pakistan by the Western, South Western, and Southern Air Commands. The bulk of the force then relocated within 48 hours to fight a second phase on the northern and eastern fronts facing China, alongside the Central and Eastern Air Commands. “We achieved relocation and re-balancing of assets from one sector to another in 48 hours,” said Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, then the IAF chief.

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During Exercise Gagan Shakti in April 2018, the Indian Air Force moved the bulk of its force from the western front to the northern and eastern fronts within 48 hours, crossing the boundaries of its own regional commands on a single order from Air Headquarters.

Those squadrons crossed the boundaries of the IAF’s own regional commands because a single authority, Air Headquarters, ordered them to. Under theatre commands, the order would come from a joint authority above the theatres, and the runways, fuel, and crews involved would be the same. Supporters of theatre commands treat such movement as part of the design rather than an exception to it.

That leaves one real question, which is who orders a theatre to give up aircraft that another theatre needs more. A commander facing a quiet front may be reluctant to release squadrons, and in a war on two fronts every theatre will want the same few aircraft at the same moment. Scarcity makes a binding arbiter more necessary, not less.

Such a moment is the “decisive test” of any theatre system, according to retired Lieutenant General Dushyant Singh, director general of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, an Army-backed think tank. There must be, he wrote in November, “one recognised mechanism to assess urgency, effect and availability, then approve, allocate and reassess.”

That referee would need firm rules, which is why India requires “a clear, rules-based authority for allocating scarce joint resources” across theatres, as retired Lieutenant General DS Hooda, a former head of the Army’s Northern Command, wrote in September 2025. He warned that the country’s distinctive needs “cannot be a pretext to preserve service silos and delay true integration.” Neither proposal gives the IAF’s aircraft away for good. Both place the decision with a joint authority that weighs every front together, which is centralised control exercised at the level where the whole war is visible.

The compromise is already on the table

The design the services have negotiated already concedes much of what the IAF asked for. The same ThePrint report said Air Headquarters will keep control of refuellers, transport aircraft, AEW&C aircraft, any future electronic intelligence aircraft, and space assets, while the fighters now held by the IAF’s regional commands pass to the theatres. The tankers that help fighters reach a distant front quickly would therefore stay under central command.

Under the plan as reported, the Pakistan-facing Western Theatre in Jaipur will be led by an IAF officer, the China-facing Northern Theatre in Lucknow by an Army officer, and the Maritime Theatre in Thiruvananthapuram by a naval officer. The previous CDS, General Anil Chauhan, submitted the proposal to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh before retiring in May.

What remains in dispute is whether the fighters inside a theatre answer to that theatre’s commander in war. That question is the heart of the reform, because a theatre commander who must negotiate with Delhi for every sortie is, in Panag’s phrase, “little more than a coordinator.”

What America and China did with scarce aircraft

In America and China, aircraft assigned to one theatre are routinely sent to another.

The United States Air Force has far more aircraft than the IAF, yet its own doctrine calls airlift and tanker forces "inherently high-demand and low-density assets," and American law is written so that such forces can move between commands. Forces assigned to a regional commander serve under that commander "except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense," and only the secretary can authorise their transfer.

The system built on that law, called Global Force Management, separates owning a force from using it. Each regional command has forces permanently assigned to it, but the Pentagon lends them to other commands for as long as a crisis lasts. Every such move needs the secretary's signed order, and these can come "many times in a single day," Caitlin Lee, an American air power analyst, wrote in March 2022.

(Insert image here)

For the Iran strikes, the US drew fighters from three other commands, and each transfer needed the Defense Secretary’s signed order.

The scarcest aircraft are kept out of any single theatre so that they can serve every theatre. Tankers and transports belong to US Transportation Command, which serves all the regional commanders, while bombers stay at home bases and deploy to whichever region needs them. India's reported plan to keep refuellers and AEW&C aircraft with Air Headquarters mirrors this arrangement.

The war against Iran this year showed how far the principle stretches. When the United States attacked Iran on 28 February 2026, it drew fighters from Europe, the American East Coast, and later the Pacific, including aircraft from the three fighter wings it permanently maintains in Europe. The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, an American air power think tank, estimated that 25 squadrons, about 324 fighters, were deployed.

If anything, the Americans worry that their aircraft move too easily. Some critics consider the system too agile, Lee notes, because regional commanders keep asking for forces and unplanned deployments drain money meant for long-term readiness. That is the opposite of the IAF's fear that a theatre would lock its aircraft away.

China's reforms follow the same logic. In 2016 the People's Liberation Army replaced seven military regions with five theatre commands, and the People's Liberation Army Air Force turned its regional air headquarters into theatre air forces while keeping bombers, transports, and airborne troops under central command. The Western Theatre Command, responsible for the border with India, has its own air force under a theatre commander.

China also moves aircraft to where they are needed. During the Ladakh standoff in 2020, satellite images from 14 June showed an additional 24 aircraft at Hotan in Xinjiang. In September, China sent J-20 stealth fighters to the border, as Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, later told the US Senate. Its Central Theatre Command, which acts as a reserve for the others, sent H-6 bombers and Y-20 transports to train on the Tibetan Plateau. In May 2024, six J-20s flew into Shigatse, less than 200 kilometres from Sikkim.

(Insert image here)

Satellite imagery since 2024 has caught J-20 stealth fighters at Shigatse, Hotan, and Damxung, three Chinese airbases facing India, while 36 new hardened aircraft shelters at Lhunze sit about 40 kilometres from the McMahon Line.

India does not need to copy either country, as AP Singh rightly argued. It needs a system of its own in which a single authority above the theatres can reassign aircraft within hours, under rules everyone knows in advance. That will be harder than drawing theatre boundaries, because most Indian defence mechanisms move through files, committees, and layered approvals, and the theatre reform itself has spent nearly seven years in inter-service talks. If moving a squadron between theatres has to pass through the same channels, the new structure will reproduce the delays of Kargil. India's design will be judged by how quickly the referee above the theatres can act.

Turf, time, and the decision ahead

Theatre commands would confine the three service chiefs to raising, training, and equipping their forces, and that loss of operational command explains much of the resistance. Turf fights between the Army and the IAF are not new, and each service has started them at different times.

The IAF has resisted the growth of the Army's air wing ever since the Army Aviation Corps was created in 1986. The Army's request for a handful of small fixed-wing aircraft for command, communication, and casualty evacuation went nowhere because of IAF objections, even though the Coast Guard and the Border Security Force fly such aircraft.

The longest quarrel was over attack helicopters. The two services argued for years over who should fly them, until Defence Minister AK Antony dismissed the fight in October 2012 as "a family problem." That month his ministry ruled, over stiff IAF opposition, that future attack helicopters would belong to the Army, while letting the IAF keep the 22 Apaches it was already buying. The Army promptly laid claim to those as well. The helicopters would be "paid for by the IAF, flown by the IAF and maintained by the IAF," Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, then the IAF chief, insisted in late 2012. The Apache purchase itself went through 13 price extensions over six years and was marred by wrangling over ownership.

The compromise gave India two Apache fleets. The IAF signed for 22 in 2015, and the Army bought six of its own under a separate contract worth about $800 million in February 2020, with plans for up to 39. The pattern repeated with the Prachand, India's own light combat helicopter. An early batch of 15 was split 10 for the IAF and five for the Army, and the order for 156 approved in March 2025 was split again, 66 and 90. India now runs two fleets of the same attack helicopters in two services, each with its own pilots and maintainers.

The Army has pressed its own claims just as hard. Its advocates still argue that the medium-lift Mi-17s and heavy-lift Chinooks, which remain with the IAF, should belong to the Army. The IAF, for its part, opposed the first CDS's plan for a separate air defence command, and its chief later called such a command counter-productive.

Where these disputes were settled at all, they were settled by dividing the assets, and India paid in duplicated fleets and lost years. Theatre commands exist to end that bargaining. "Resistance by those who perceive themselves as losers cannot be allowed to block an increase in effectiveness of the organisation as a whole," Ajai Shukla, a retired Army colonel who writes on defence on his blog Broadsword, wrote in January.

The deeper failure is political. The government "has seemingly left this reform measure to the military, with a predictable outcome of institutional in-fighting," Anit Mukherjee wrote in August. Mukherjee, director of Carnegie India and author of The Absent Dialogue, a study of civil-military relations in India, added that theatre commands "can only be instituted with political intent."

The legal groundwork already exists. Rules under the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act of 2023, in force since May 2025, let commanders of joint formations discipline personnel from all three services. Dixit now says "everybody is on board" and that only "a few details are left." The final step belongs to the Cabinet Committee on Security, which must approve the framework and set a timetable.

The IAF is right that it has too few aircraft, and that is the strongest reason to put them under commanders who see the whole battle. A force that cannot afford to waste a single sortie can least afford to plan its wars from three separate headquarters.


r/IndianDefense • • 13h ago

News Bangladeshi national found recceing tourist spots and military airbases of Baghdogra and Hasimara, arrested; confesses to having close links with Pakistani diplomat in Dhaka

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60 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 18h ago

Discussion/Opinions Why DRDO's UTTAM and Virupaksha AESA radars are arguably the single biggest game-changer in Indian military aviation history. (IAF's 1st Homegrown AESA incoming)..

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112 Upvotes

I've been following LRDE's radar work closely for yrs now, and seeing the actual AAU up close at DRDO pavilion back during aero-india23 in Blr completely changed how i look at indian aerospace engineering. while everyone on this sub obsesses over airframes and foreign engine deals, our real quiet revolution is happening inside the nose cones of our fighters. we're mastering solid-state AESA fire-control radars with uttam family, and now scaling it into the beastly 2400-module GaN virupaksha for mki, it is arguably the single biggest strategic leap india has made since our missile and WMDs programs. only a tiny handful of nations on earth (US, china, france, russia, israel and japan) can actually design, fabricate, and write signal-processing algorithms for a frontline airborne aesa radar from scratch and india just forced its way into that club with ~95% IC.

to understand why our indig uttam is such a massive deal compared to legacy radars like that stone age Russian BARS PESA on our sukhois or that Ancient (mechanical) zhuk-me on our mig29s, you hv to look at how the hardware actually works. first of all, an old radar uses a single central traveling-wave tube transmitter pumping rf energy through a single antenna and if that tube fails, you are blind, and its fixed-frequency pulses scream your exact position to enemy RWRs from 200km away. uttam replaces that entire architecture with 912+ individual x-band TRMs arranged in modular liquid-cooled quad-pack "planks" (built alongside domestic private players like astra microwave, which just this yr bagged a ₹2205cr production order for the 97-jet mk1a batch). bcz every single TRM acts as an independent miniature transceiver with its own phase shifter and low-noise amplifier, uttam can steer beams electronically in microseconds with 0 mechanical inertia, interleave a2a track-while-scan (tracking 50-100 targets simultaneously while engaging multiple) with SAR ground mapping and maritime inverse SAR modes at exact same time and execute ultra-fast pseudo-random frequency hopping across a wide bandwidth. that frequency agility gives it true LPI capability (meaning your radar paints an enemy fighter without triggering a coherent lock spike on their rwr until your missile is already terminal).

and the real engineering flex isn't just that GAAs uttam mk1 going onto the second batch of mk1as, it is how LRDE used that exact modular plank architecture to leap straight into GaN semiconductors for mk2, amca and mki's virupaksha. in RF physics, GaN is a wide-bandgap semiconductor that operates at much higher breakdown voltages and thermal tolerances than GAAs (btw rafale also has GAAs) delivering roughly 4-5 times higher power density in the exact same physical nose-cone aperture while generating less waste heat. when you pack ~2400 gan trms onto a swashplate-mounted virupaksha array inside mki's massive radome (tripling the module count of rbe2-aa french) you push your ancient mki's detection out past 300–400km and give our flankers genuine counter-stealth detection range against low-rcs targets like j20, backed by brutal ECCM that can burn straight through enemy DRFM jamming.

but to me, the biggest game-changer is 100% software and source-code sovereignty. for decades, every time IAF wanted to integrate a new wpn or update threat libraries on a foreign radar, we had to beg foreign OEMs(yeah, those same russian OEMs which can't even make a AESA today for their Own VKS af) pay hundreds of millions in non-recurring engineering fees and moreover wait yrs for them to write the code.

bcz drdo and BEL own every single line of uttam and virupaksha's digital receiver/exciter firmware and signal-processing algorithms, we can integrate indigenous weapons like astra mk2/mk3 and rudram ARMs on our own timeline and rewrite EW waveforms overnight during a conflict.

i still think HAL messed up by letting certification delays push uttam off the first 83 mk1as onto 2nd 97-jet batch.

~Analysis by VERTEX (X) CC.


r/IndianDefense • • 16h ago

Geopolitics Japan to use Indian ranges for missile tests as New Delhi-Tokyo move to boost defence ties

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69 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 12h ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism Andhra police uncover arms dump left behind by slain Maoist commander Madvi Hidma

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25 Upvotes

The recovery from a location in Polavaram police district in the Andhra Pradesh-Chhattisgarh border region includes as many as 670 Barrel Grenade Launcher (BGL) shells and 42 detonators


r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Armed Insurgency/Terrorism How sections of Indian media have, over the years, sought to humanise terrorists by emphasising their civilian identities

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244 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 14h ago

News Bangladesh PM: Hasina ‘conspiring to please masters across the border’; those providing shelter stood with terrorists rather than the country’s democratic people; did not fight the Liberation War in 71 or lead the uprising in 2024 to submit to anyone

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30 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Pics/Videos IAF cheetah helicopter.

174 Upvotes

HAL Cheetah (Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama) helicopter operated by the Indian Air Force.

Use in high-altitude terrain of the Siachen Glacier or Ladakh.

By the way do you think the guy with the glasses is the same guy here.👇

https://www.reddit.com/r/IndianDefense/s/JYbHkWrp9G

Courtesy - Olive Cobra @loveforolivegreen

https://www.pixnoy.com/post/6754553215621037721226/


r/IndianDefense • • 23h ago

News India, Japan to finalise use of Indian ranges for Japanese missile

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92 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

News US court seeks Delhi courts' help to serve summonses on Ajit Doval, Goel

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39 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 18h ago

Discussion/Opinions FlightGlobal released new report showing that India currently has 32 active Rafales in 2026, flightGlobal's report published in nov, 2025 after Op Sindoor listed 35 active Rafales. Here is the question: after Op Sindoor, India has not been involved in any military conflict and 0 Rafale crashes too.

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11 Upvotes

Source: BharatIntel360


r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

News Hospitalised in Qatar, 67-year-old former Navy commander’s family appeals to Modi for release

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38 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 17h ago

Pics/Videos 50 Years of Unwavering Vigil - Albatross #IndianNavy

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7 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Weapon/Platform Analysis HTT-40 empennage designs

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40 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

Military History The last known photo of the the brave men of 13 KUMAON marching towards their positions at RezangLa, probably mid to late October 1962

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146 Upvotes

r/IndianDefense • • 1d ago

News Exclusive: Astra to go on Rafale as IAF insists on freedom to fit weapons, own-network link for 114 jets

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108 Upvotes