r/NFA • u/Anonkarmawhore1 • 7h ago
Legal Question ⚖️ If 200,000 Stun Guns Can Be Considered Common Use, Why Not 234,000 Transferable Machine Guns? A Form 1 Challenge to the Hughes Amendment
I’ve been digging into the constitutionality of the Hughes Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §922(o), particularly the argument that machine guns fall outside Second Amendment protection because they’re considered “dangerous and unusual.”
The more I research it, the more questions I have about how courts determine what constitutes common use, especially when the government itself has restricted the supply of a particular firearm for 40 years.
According to ATF’s published statistics, as of June 2025 there were approximately 234,718 transferable machine guns in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
That doesn’t mean 234,718 individual civilians own machine guns. Some are held by dealers, government entities, or others. But these are firearms that qualify for transfer under the pre-May 19, 1986 grandfather provision.
Now compare that with Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016).
In that case, the Supreme Court rejected Massachusetts’ reasoning for excluding stun guns from Second Amendment protection.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, specifically discussed the fact that hundreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns had been sold to private citizens. He considered those numbers relevant to determining whether they were in common use for lawful purposes.
To be clear, the Court did not establish 200,000 as some magical constitutional threshold. And Alito’s discussion was a concurrence, not the Court’s holding.
But the comparison raises an interesting question.
If hundreds of thousands of stun guns are relevant evidence of common use, why are hundreds of thousands of legally registered transferable machine guns treated so differently?
I recognize that machine guns and stun guns have different capabilities, risks, and legal histories. I’m not arguing that their ownership numbers alone make them constitutionally equivalent.
What interests me is the government’s role in creating the very scarcity that courts subsequently rely upon.
Consider the timeline:
Before May 19, 1986, eligible civilians could lawfully manufacture and register machine guns using ATF Form 1, subject to the NFA.
After the Hughes Amendment, that pathway was generally closed to ordinary civilians.
For the last 40 years, the civilian transferable supply has effectively been frozen, with no general pathway for newly manufactured machine guns to enter that market.
Then courts evaluate whether machine guns are in common use by examining the relatively limited number available to civilians.
Isn’t that circular reasoning?
The government restricts the supply, then points to the restricted supply as evidence that the firearm is unusual, and therefore outside constitutional protection.
How could any prohibited category of arms ever become common under that standard?
Here’s where the Form 1 question comes in.
Suppose a law-abiding citizen submits an ATF Form 1 seeking authorization to manufacture and register a new machine gun.
The applicant is willing to comply with the NFA, undergo the background check, register the firearm, and pay any applicable tax.
ATF denies the application under §922(o).
The applicant then challenges that denial in federal court rather than manufacturing anything unlawfully.
This isn’t entirely hypothetical as a legal strategy.
In Hollis v. Lynch (5th Cir. 2016), a plaintiff pursued essentially that approach. The Fifth Circuit recognized standing but ultimately rejected the Second Amendment challenge.
What’s particularly interesting is that Hollis discussed the Caetano concurrence and the comparison between stun gun ownership and machine gun ownership.
That makes me wonder whether the historical-tradition framework subsequently established in Bruen, and clarified in Rahimi, provides any meaningful basis for revisiting that analysis.
I also haven’t been able to locate a reliable ATF breakdown showing how many machine guns were originally manufactured and registered by civilians on Form 1 before May 19, 1986.
That seems like relevant historical data worth obtaining.
The questions I’m interested in discussing are:
Can government-created scarcity legitimately establish that a category of firearms is constitutionally unusual?
How should courts evaluate common use when civilian acquisition has been substantially restricted for decades?
What significance should Caetano have when comparing ownership numbers across different categories of arms?
Does Bruen change the constitutional analysis applied in Hollis, or does Heller’s discussion of M16s effectively foreclose the argument?
What historical analogue supports a categorical prohibition on newly manufactured civilian machine guns, rather than registration and regulation under the NFA?
Could a properly structured civil challenge following a Form 1 denial present these questions for judicial review without anyone violating federal law?
I’m aware that there is substantial unfavorable precedent here. I’m not pretending Heller didn’t discuss M16s or that courts haven’t repeatedly upheld §922(o).
I’m also not advocating that anyone manufacture or possess anything prohibited under current law.
What I’m questioning is whether the government should be able to use the consequences of its own restrictions as the constitutional justification for maintaining those restrictions.
I’m interested in understanding whether there’s a legitimate constitutional argument here, not just another discussion about whether machine guns should be legal. I am sure anyone who paid a pile of cash for a transferable would oppose this as it would make those guns worth significantly less.