r/freewill • u/impersonal_process • 3h ago
Wind-up dolls: no one chooses what will convince them, free will or skepticism
*Look at your body- A painted puppet, a poor toy Of jointed parts ready to collapse, A diseased and suffering thing With a head full of false imaginings.
The Dhammapada*
First: our actions are the consequence of our genes, character, environment, and the ideas we have encountered.
Second: beyond these causes there is no agency that independently makes decisions or halts an action already under way.
Third: no one determines which consideration will persuade them or which motive will prevail.
Fourth: the state that determines our movement was created earlier, and at the moment of movement there is no decision that is not a product of that earlier state.
The first claim is the least controversial, and almost no one denies it outright. The weight of the topic lies in the second and third. They deny not the causes, but someone who stands above them.
Genes, character, environment, and ideas are not four independent forces that converge at each decision. They are four ways of describing one and the same story.
Character is not a separate source alongside genes and environment. It is the state to which they have brought the organism at a given moment. When we say "he acted that way because of his character," we are not pointing to something independent. We are pointing to the accumulated result of heredity and experience.
Ideas come from outside, through language, upbringing, reading, and conversation. Yet each of them takes effect only insofar as it fits with what is already there. The same book changes one reader and leaves another indifferent. The difference lies not in the book, but in what genes and prior environment had prepared before it.
"I" is the name of the whole system in which these processes take place, not of a single unit within it that directs them.
The veto is just another decision. The strongest attempt to preserve the independent player is to grant it the right to stop. Benjamin Libet arrives at this way out after his own experiments. The brain's preparation for movement begins about half a second before the action, while the conscious intention appears only two to three tenths of a second before it. Libet concludes that consciousness does not initiate the action, but can stop it. In English this is called free won't.
The problem is not in the experiments but in the logic. Stopping an action is an action like any other. If it has causes, they are of the same kind as the causes of the impulse it stops. If it has no causes, we fall into randomness.
Later research shows this in practice as well. Stopping a given movement has its own brain activity (Brass and Haggard, 2007), as well as its own point after which it is no longer possible (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). The veto has its own precursors, just like the impulse it stops.
The thesis, however, does not depend on these data. Even if the conscious decision to stop preceded everything unconscious, it would still spring from something. Shyness, fear of consequences, a rule learned in childhood: all of these are genes, character, environment, and ideas. The veto is not an intervention from outside the causes, but one cause that has prevailed over another.
No one chooses what will persuade them. We cannot decide to believe something. Try now, by an effort of will, to believe that it is raining in the room. You can say the sentence, you can imagine it, but you will not believe it. Bernard Williams showed why in his essay "Deciding to Believe" (1970): a belief acquired at will, regardless of whether it is true, would not be a belief.
The same goes for persuasion. An argument persuades us when it seems true, and whether it seems true depends on what we already know, whom we trust, and what we stand to lose. None of these things is chosen in the moment of the dispute.
Even the decision "I will be open to opposing arguments" is no exception. That openness is a habit that one person has and another does not. Whoever has it acquired it through temperament, upbringing, or good teachers.
The same holds for motives. When two motives clash, the one that prevails is the one that carries greater weight for the whole system at that moment. There is no "someone" who sets the weight; rather, the weight determines what we will afterwards call "my decision." Schopenhauer puts it most concisely: a man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills.
The thesis does not lead to passivity. Deliberation changes the outcome, arguments change people, and the freedom to act without coercion is real and important. All that disappears is the assumption that someone beyond them decides which arguments are to be taken as adequate.
This can be tested with a single question. If the genes, character, environment, ideas, and the state at a given instant are identical, can the decision be different? If it cannot, there is no independent player. If it can, the difference comes from chance, for which no one is responsible either.
From this follows a practical conclusion about argument. Since no one chooses what will persuade them, it makes sense to criticize arguments, not to despise the person they have failed to persuade. A new argument is one more cause and nothing more. It may prevail, or it may not.
The decision does not end the contest between causes. It is its result. There is no "chooser" on whom it depends which will prevail. Whatever prevails is afterwards called "I chose."