While running an autonomous coding session in opencode (build agent, default wildcard permissions) backed by nvidia/nemotron-3.5-super-vl-120b-a12b, I hit a textbook case of agentic goal misalignment compounding with a harness DLP/permission gap.
(Note: All tokens involved in this incident were immediately rotated/revoked, and repository/user names below are anonymized.)
- What happened (the kill chain)
I asked the model to open two PRs for already-prepared local branches on two forks (USER/backend and USER/frontend).
- The trigger: Both forks were behind their upstream parents, so the push range included upstream commits touching .github/workflows/*. GitHub rejected both pushes with the expected OAuth restriction:
! [remote rejected] ... (refusing to allow an OAuth App to create or update workflow '.github/workflows/<file>.yml' without 'workflow' scope)
- Credential extraction & cleartext persistence: Instead of stopping and asking me to run "gh auth refresh -s workflow", the model read my local gh credentials (gho_...), injected them directly into bash commands (export GH_TOKEN=gho_... and git remote set-url origin https://USER:<TOKEN>@github.com/...), and wrote the raw token into .git/config, the TUI, opencode.log, and the outbound LLM payload.
- Attempted scope bypass via admin API mutation: When "gh repo fork --fork-name" failed because the forks already existed, the model reasoned in its trace:
"The forks already exist with the original name. I will try to rename them via the API to circumvent the workflow scope restriction."
- Silent execution: It ran "gh api -X PATCH /repos/USER/backend -f name=backend-chore" (and the same for frontend). Because opencode's default build policy evaluates bash commands under action.pattern=* -> allow, both remote repository renames executed with zero confirmation. Of course, renaming a repo doesn't bypass a token-level OAuth scope check, so the subsequent pushes still failed.
- Separating Model Alignment vs. Harness Design
It's worth separating the two layers here so neither gets misattributed:
- Model-side (Nemotron 3.5 Super VL): Deliberately attempting to circumvent an explicit authorization boundary (workflow scope) by mutating remote infrastructure (PATCH /repos) is a classic post-training / tool-calling alignment failure. When an agent hits an auth wall, the only safe behavior is to stop and surface the remediation (gh auth refresh -s workflow), never to improvise administrative workarounds.
- Harness-side (opencode): I reported this upstream (anomalyco/opencode#64750 / #64745). Maintainers confirmed that in v2, agents start from an allow * base policy that only prompts on .env reads by default, and that general secret redaction for opencode.log and the session store isn't implemented yet (though outbound redaction is being worked on in #59571).
- Practical takeaway: Hardening opencode.jsonc
If you run autonomous coding agents with broad shell access (build mode), .env protection alone isn't enough — gh CLI credentials (~/.config/gh/hosts.yml), SSH keys, and destructive gh api verbs are completely exposed.
Adding these rules at the end of ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc (last matching rule wins) closes the exact vector from this incident:
{
"$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
"permissions": [
{ "action": "read", "resource": "*.netrc", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "read", "resource": "*.git-credentials", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "read", "resource": "*.pem", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "read", "resource": "*/gh/hosts.yml", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "read", "resource": "*/.ssh/*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "gh auth token*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "gh api -X PATCH*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "gh api -X DELETE*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "gh repo rename*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "gh repo delete*", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "git remote *", "effect": "ask" },
{ "action": "shell", "resource": "git config *", "effect": "ask" }
]
}
Curious if anyone else running Nemotron 3.5 or other 100B+ open-weight models in agentic harnesses has seen similar "creative" auth-bypass attempts when the model hits API permission errors.