Episode 204 was about turning off what you don't need. This week's Into the Terminal (episode 205) is the sequel: harden what you can't get rid of. Scott and Nate layer defense in depth on a RHEL box — filesystem mount options that stop planted binaries from becoming root, a live tcpdump of passwords flying across the wire in cleartext (and the same request vanishing under TLS), one-command system-wide crypto policy, and a full MariaDB hardening walkthrough that includes the SELinux denial you shouldn't "fix" with setenforce 0.
Full video here → https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDrPZT-TvX4
More hands-on RHEL practice → https://redhat.com/interactive-labs
The Essentials: Filesystem Mount Options Are Security Controls
Compliance frameworks don't just ask for fancy partitioning so your disk layout looks impressive. Separate mounts for things like /tmp, /var, and /home do two jobs:
- Contain disk-full disasters — if
/var fills up, logging and services get unhappy, but you can still log in and read /etc
- Give you different mount options per filesystem — you can't slap
noexec on / without breaking sudo, ls, and everything else you need
Scott mounted a tiny demo filesystem on /mnt and dropped three "interesting" files on it: a setuid copy of sudo, a setgid write binary, and a tiny shell script. Colorized ls made the special bits obvious. Running the planted sudo as a normal user escalated to root — because setuid does what it says on the tin, even when the binary is sitting in a weird directory instead of /usr/bin.
| Mount option | What it does |
nosuid | Ignores setuid and setgid bits — planted root-setuid binaries can't escalate |
noexec | Nothing on this filesystem can be executed (even if the execute bit is set) |
nodev | Device nodes created with mknod aren't honored — kills planted /dev/sda-style tricks |
mount -o remount,nosuid /mnt
mount -o remount,noexec /mnt
mount -o remount,nosuid,nodev,noexec /mnt
umount /mnt
mount -a mount | grep /mnt
Pro tips from the show:
- Test with
mount -o remount,... first (like firewall rules in memory) — if you brick something, a reboot still saves you. Writing a broken entry straight into /etc/fstab means the next reboot puts you right back in the broken state.
- After editing fstab,
mount -a is how you find out now whether the syntax is good — don't wait for reboot day.
- You need the more complex partition layout for this to work. One big
/ filesystem means you can't noexec/nosuid the places users can write without also breaking legitimate system binaries.
- Nate ran a Summit booth challenge years ago that was literally "why won't my script run?" with
/tmp mounted noexec. Plenty of working Linux admins couldn't solve it. Common ≠ known.
(Spaces vs tabs in fstab: Scott lined things up with spaces. Nate called him a heathen. Tab stops entered the chat.)
Harden the Wire: Plaintext vs. Encrypted
Nate's first packet-capture demo still feels like a superpower the first time you see it — and that's the point.
| Command | What it does |
tcpdump -i any -n -A 'tcp port 80' | Capture HTTP in cleartext (ASCII payload dump) |
curl -d 'user=admin&password=SuperSecret123' http://127.0.0.1/ | POST "secrets" over plain HTTP |
tcpdump -i any -n -A 'tcp port 443' | Same capture on HTTPS |
curl -k -d 'user=admin&password=SuperSecret123' https://127.0.0.1/ | Same POST over TLS (-k = accept self-signed) |
On port 80, the capture shows the POST body in cleartext — username, password, the whole request. On port 443 with mod_ssl's out-of-the-box self-signed cert, that same payload is just TLS noise. You can't read it.
Takeaways they hammered:
- A self-signed cert encrypts just as well as a CA-signed one. The CA adds trust (browsers/clients accept the identity without warnings), not stronger crypto. Key length and algorithms determine how hard it is to crack.
- Protect the private key. Heartbleed (over a decade ago) was scary specifically because it could leak keys from memory — and with the key, you can impersonate the service.
- Open Wi-Fi (Starbucks "click I agree" portals with no password) is often cleartext between you and the AP. Encrypt your own sessions (TLS, VPN) regardless.
- Switched wired networks usually only show you your own traffic unless there's a SPAN/mirror port. Wi-Fi on the same AP is a different story.
Advanced: Raise the Crypto Floor System-Wide
Hand-tuning OpenSSH, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, NSS, Kerberos… forever is a losing game. RHEL gives you one knob: system-wide crypto policies.
| Command | What it does |
update-crypto-policies --show | Print the active policy (usually DEFAULT out of the box) |
update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE | Raise the floor — refuse weaker algorithms/key sizes |
update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT | Back to the sane modern baseline |
update-crypto-policies --set LEGACY | Loosen for ancient gear (going the wrong way — last resort) |
update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:NO-SHA1 | Surgical subpolicy: keep DEFAULT, kill SHA-1 signatures |
Built-in policies worth knowing: DEFAULT, FUTURE, LEGACY, and FIPS (pairs with fips-mode-setup — its own rabbit hole).
What FUTURE actually breaks (live demo)
Scott flipped the box to FUTURE, then systemctl restart httpd — Apache refused to start. The smoking gun in /var/log/httpd/ssl_error_log: the default mod_ssl certificate key was too small. FUTURE wants something stronger than a 2048-bit RSA key (think 3072+ minimum); the stock self-signed cert was 2048.
openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:4096 \
-keyout /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key \
-out /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \
-subj "/CN=$(hostname)"
systemctl restart httpd
Caveats from the show:
- After changing policy, reboot (or at least restart crypto-using services). Already-running processes keep the old policy in memory.
- Distro packages that use the system crypto libraries honor the policy. Containers, Flatpaks, and third-party apps (Chrome was the example) often ship their own crypto stacks and ignore the host policy entirely.
- Stronger crypto = more math per connection. Fine for low-volume boxes; measure CPU on high-connection services.
- Post-quantum: Nate's take — if you're standing up a new box today, enable quantum-safe algorithms from day one. RHEL 10 does this by default; RHEL 9 makes it an option. Older distros often don't have the algorithms at all.
Advanced: Harden a Real Service End-to-End (MariaDB)
Fresh dnf install + enable. No databases, no passwords — stock out of the box. RHEL ships services a bit more locked down than many community distros, but "a little hardened" ≠ "done."
1. See where it's listening
ss -tulnp | grep 3306
Out of the box: 0.0.0.0:3306 and [::]:3306 — every IPv4 and IPv6 interface. Dual-stack is the default on modern RHEL; firewalling only IPv4 and forgetting IPv6 is a classic footgun.
2. Bind to localhost
Edit /etc/my.cnf.d/mariadb-server.cnf, under [mysqld]:
bind-address=127.0.0.1
systemctl restart mariadb
ss -tulnp | grep 3306
Same localhost-binding idea they previewed with Postgres in ep. 204. If the DB only needs local app access, don't put it on the network.
(Why [mysqld] not [mariadbd]? MariaDB forked from MySQL after license drama; config blocks and CLI tools stayed compatible for years so people weren't stranded.)
3. "Just change the port" — and the SELinux lesson
Changing port=3307 and restarting → MariaDB refuses to start. Not a typo — SELinux denied the bind.
sudo ausearch -m avc -ts recent
sudo semanage port -a -t mysqld_port_t -p tcp 3307
systemctl restart mariadb
Apache often already allows 80/443/8080/8443. MariaDB's allowed port list is tighter. Teach SELinux the new port; don't turn it off.
And this still isn't "security." Nate's Windows SQL Server story: the boss insisted on checking "Hide SQL Server," which just added 1000 to the port (1433 → 2433). Attackers added 2433 to their scan lists. Security by obscurity is at best one thin layer — never the plan.
4. Run mariadb-secure-installation
The bundled wizard walks common hygiene:
| Step | Why it matters |
| Switch root to UNIX socket auth | Root DB access tied to the local Linux account / socket — not a network password |
| Set a root password | Out-of-box often has none |
| Remove anonymous users | Default anonymous accounts are free attack surface |
| Disallow remote root login | Defense in depth even after socket auth |
| Remove the test database | Optional in labs / handoff environments; usually gone before prod |
| Reload privilege tables | Apply now, or defer to a maintenance window |
5. More you can still do (discussed, not fully demoed)
| Hardening idea | Why |
local-infile=0 | Disable LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE — harder for a compromised client/session to slurp files off the server |
| Password validation plugin | Enforce password quality at the DB layer |
Scope your GRANTs | GRANT ALL … TO user@'%' is the most common real-world sin — grant only what's needed, only from the expected host |
Apply the same mindset to SSH, httpd, or anything else you leave running: evaluate the out-of-box defaults against your threat model, then turn off what isn't serving you.
Related episodes
Quick Reference Card
mount -o remount,nosuid,nodev,noexec /mnt
umount /mnt && mount -a && mount | grep /mnt
tcpdump -i any -n -A 'tcp port 80'
curl -d 'user=admin&password=SuperSecret123' http://127.0.0.1/
tcpdump -i any -n -A 'tcp port 443'
curl -k -d 'user=admin&password=SuperSecret123' https://127.0.0.1/
update-crypto-policies --show
sudo update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE sudo update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT
sudo update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:NO-SHA1
tail /var/log/httpd/ssl_error_log openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 -newkey rsa:4096 \
-keyout /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key \
-out /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \
-subj "/CN=$(hostname)"
ss -tulnp | grep 3306
sudo ausearch -m avc -ts recent
sudo semanage port -a -t mysqld_port_t -p tcp 3307
systemctl restart mariadb
mariadb-secure-installation
Links
- 📺 Watch the full episode: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EDrPZT-TvX4
- 🎓 Get started with RHEL: https://developers.redhat.com/register
- 🧪 Try it yourself — Interactive Labs: https://redhat.com/interactive-labs
- 💬 Join the Discord: https://red.ht/rhel-discord
- Nate Lager: https://social.undrground.org/@gangrif
- Scott McBrien: https://www.linkedin.com/in/scott-mcbrien-349b356
Into the Terminal is a (mostly) weekly live show where Red Hatters dig into Linux and RHEL administration skills — one terminal command, one bad pun, and one "oops, wrong window" at a time.