r/threatintel • • Aug 11 '24

Official CTI Discord Community

26 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

Exciting news for our community on reddit, in collaboration with r/CTI (thanks to u/SirEliasRiddle for his hard in work in setting this up for all of us).

We're launching a brand new Discord server dedicated to Cyber Threat Intelligence. It's a space for sharing content, news, resources, and engaging in discussions with others in the cybersecurity world. Since the community is still in its early stages, it might not have all the features yet but we're eager to hear your suggestions and feedback. This includes criticisms.

Feel free to join us and share the link with friends!

Discord Link


r/threatintel • • 4h ago

APT/Threat Actor Follow-up to our North Korean IT-worker research: the other side of it is recruiters asking real employees to lend their identity

6 Upvotes

Between October 3 and November 6, 2026, we found eight North Korea-linked operators emailing roughly 38 employees at 13 organizations we monitor. They weren’t applying for jobs this time. They were the recruiters.

The pitch was the same in every version. Create an account on an AI-training platform. Complete the identity verification yourself. An offshore team does the actual work under that account, and you keep a share. The platforms named were DataAnnotation, Outlier, Handshake AI, Mercor, Snorkel, and AfterQuery. They’re legitimate platforms, and they aren’t the problem here. One email opened with ‘What if you could earn money even while you’re asleep?’ One recruiter put the whole arrangement as ‘You can just make the accounts and allow me to work on that.’

The packaging changed from sender to sender. Some promised $8,000 or $10,000 a month, with the recipient keeping 30% to 50%. One introduced himself as a senior full-stack and AI engineer in Singapore looking for a long-term collaborator. Another said his previous AI-training account was no longer active and he needed help getting access to new opportunities.

Some emails linked a Google Doc titled ‘Flexible Side-Income Opportunity.’ It read like an ordinary business proposal, with a team introduction, a list of platforms, earnings screenshots, a privacy policy, 30% of project revenue, a $150 monthly minimum, and a $50 referral bonus. It also explained why they needed someone: many of these platforms mainly accept US-based individuals and verify identity through services like Persona. Then it said ‘That’s why we’re seeking your collaboration.’ It laid out the split. The team finds the projects, prepares the applications, and does the work. The recruit creates the accounts and completes verification.

Nobody was asked for a password or a passport. The messages told people not to share those directly. They were asked to complete the verification themselves. If an identity can’t get past verification on its own, convince its owner to do that part.

We’ve been tracking North Korea-linked fake applicants, and fake identities are already central to that scheme. We can’t say from the emails alone what these accounts were used for. What they show is what recruiting real people to provide access to their identities can look like, and it may be one way operators source them.

If a version of this pitch has landed in your organization, what did it look like, and did anyone report it?


r/threatintel • • 1h ago

APT/Threat Actor Inside a Russian-speaking credential-theft operation: 603 implants, US bank and federal identity loot, one exposed directory

1 Upvotes

Hunt researchers got a full view of this one because the operator left the loot and tasking store exposed on a Netherlands VPS (145.63.138[.]67, Podaon SIA).

Scope: 603 implants across 469 hostnames over a 27-day window (12 Oct to 8 Nov 2026), processed through three custom C2 components on a single box. The stolen data is the better signal than the beacon geography, which is hidden behind Cloudflare. At least 57 victims hold a US bank or government login and at least 46 hold a US federal identity account, with ID.me on roughly 20 and Login.gov on roughly 19, which are the way in to IRS, SSA and VA. Chase shows up in 31 victim datasets, Capital One in 20, Citi in 17, Wells Fargo in 15.

Attribution is hedged but consistent: Russian-language comments, docstrings and full operational log prose throughout 249 files, written for the operator's own use. The toolchain also targets 35 AI developer products and 44 crypto platforms.

Full campaign scope and IOCs: https://hunt.io/blog/us-bank-irs-ssa-logins-stolen-russian-speaking-operator


r/threatintel • • 5h ago

Project Zero has cut its disclosure deadline from 90 days to 30

0 Upvotes

That 90-day window was set based on how long it reasonably took a human researcher to go from bug to working exploit. Google is saying that assumption no longer holds, because of AI-assisted exploit development.

Vendor patch cadences, internal vulnerability SLAs and the common "we'll fix it next release" habit were all built on the assumption that 90 days was generous enough. It wasn't generous, but it was something teams could work within.

30 days is going to break a lot of patching processes that were already running close to the old deadline, and that needed to happen. Some might say that 30 days is even too long.

What do you think?


r/threatintel • • 13h ago

Any Reccomendation Regarding Threat Hunting Tools ?

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2 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 13h ago

Open-source phishing and email header analyzer that runs 100% client-side via WebAssembly: SPF/DKIM/DMARC, HTML smuggling, .msg support, STIX/MISP export

1 Upvotes

Most online email header analyzers want you to paste the message into someone else’s server. For phishing triage that’s awkward: the headers contain internal hostnames, employee addresses and sometimes the whole message.

So I built ESHA (Email Security Header Analyzer). The analysis engine is Python running in your browser through Pyodide (WebAssembly). There’s no backend. The page has a CSP with connect-src 'self', so it can’t contact any other server, and you can check in DevTools → Network that nothing is sent when you analyze a message.

Live: https://0xanalyst.github.io/email-security-header-analyzer/
Source (GPL-3.0): https://github.com/0xAnalyst/email-security-header-analyzer

What it does

  • Paste headers, or drop an .eml or Outlook .msg file
  • SPF / DKIM / DMARC / ARC from the receiving server’s Authentication-Results, plus a domain alignment table: From vs envelope sender vs DKIM d= vs Return-Path vs Reply-To vs HELO
  • Relay route hop by hop, with each hop’s delay; the slowest hop is marked in red (like Microsoft’s MHA) and Created vs Delivered time are shown. Clock skew is handled without reporting a fake 24-hour delay.
  • Look-alike domains (typos, Cyrillic/Greek homoglyphs, punycode) and cousin domains of the sender’s own org in Reply-To and links (classic invoice and payroll fraud)
  • Recognises SendGrid, Mailchimp, SES, Mailgun, SFMC and others, so “SPF passed for sendgrid.net” is explained instead of flagged. When DMARC fails, it tells you why that pass is meaningless.

Newer phishing techniques it checks (static parsing only, nothing is opened or run)

  • HTML smuggling in HTML/SVG attachments (atob, Blob, msSaveOrOpenBlob, large base64 blobs)
  • Password-protected and nested ZIPs, and ISO images hiding .lnk or .exe files (it reads the ISO 9660 directory, it doesn’t extract)
  • QR-code phishing (detects image-only or “scan this code” messages; doesn’t decode the QR)
  • Calendar-invite phishing, fake “RE:” replies, and thread hijacking from look-alike domains
  • DKIM signatures that don’t sign From or use l=, and BIMI headers on mail that fails DMARC

For the analyst workflow

  • Every finding has a stable rule ID, a “what to do” note and a MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  • IOC tab with defanged values; export as CSV, JSON, STIX 2.1 or a MISP event (only suspicious items get to_ids or become STIX indicators, so SendGrid doesn’t end up on a blocklist)
  • A self-contained HTML report for tickets (no scripts, links defanged)
  • It also runs locally (./run.sh, Docker) with a CLI and JSON API, e.g. esha analyze mail.msg -f stix -o bundle.json

Limitations, so nobody is surprised

  • The risk score is heuristic. It’s for triage, not proof.
  • No DNS, WHOIS or reputation lookups. That’s deliberate, to keep it offline. An opt-in enrichment mode for the local version is planned.
  • The bundled GeoLite2 country data is old; you can update it locally with a free MaxMind key.
  • RTF-only .msg bodies aren’t decoded, and RAR/7z contents aren’t fully listed.
  • The first visit downloads about 14 MB (the Python runtime); after that it’s cached.

I tested it against a set of legitimate newsletters, receipts, calendar invites and mailing-list posts that all have to score “low”. False positives are what I most want to hear about. If it flags a legitimate message from your environment, or misses something obvious, please open an issue (with sanitized headers).

It started from the open-source MHA project by lnxg33k and has been mostly rewritten since. Feedback welcome.


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

APT/Threat Actor WhiteArmor: a 3-week-old extortion crew has already hit Maersk, J.B. Hunt, Ryder and Echo, and is openly recruiting insiders for Okta/VPN/Jenkins access

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8 Upvotes

We’ve been tracking WhiteArmor since its leak site appeared on 20 October. In about three weeks it has named 17 victims, with an unusual concentration in transportation and logistics: Maersk (which has confirmed a breach of an acquired legacy system), J.B. Hunt (disclosed, now facing class actions), Ryder, and Echo Global Logistics, all claimed inside a 15-day window.

The more interesting artifact is a recruitment post the group calls “Project Trojan Horse.” Rather than just leaking data, it openly solicits initial-access brokers and insiders and names exactly what it wants: Okta, Azure, IAM, Jenkins, and VPN appliances (Fortinet, AnyConnect, Citrix, SonicWall). It sets a $500M revenue floor for targets and excludes the CIS region. Effectively a published targeting spec.

Most of the 17 are still unverified leak-site claims (only Maersk and J.B. Hunt have public corroboration), but the access list is a useful hardening checklist regardless: identity platforms, CI/CD, and VPN gateways, plus stale credentials in acquired or legacy environments.

Full write-up with the victim breakdown and demand amounts (disclosure: this is our own tracking data): https://darkwebsonar.io/blog/dark-web-most-wanted-2026-whitearmor/

Happy to answer questions on the telemetry.


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Quick intel briefing regarding the Optimizely incident

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5 Upvotes

This is a brief sent to current users of freecti.org, sharing here for a quick rundown for everyone since Free CTI's AI already collated and merged info from multiple sources.


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Optimizely malware hit 178 major sites (Zoom, BBC, HSBC). Only 15% had a CSP that stopped it. A breakdown of what worked and what didn't

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4 Upvotes

Quick summary for anyone who missed it:

On 16 November an attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web (an A/B testing tool) and added code to customers' "Project JavaScript" field. Optimizely's own CDN then served it to every page on 178 organisations' sites for most of the day, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, Salesforce, GitLab and IKEA.

The payload:
\- swapped crypto wallet addresses on the page and clipboard
\- skimmed card number, expiry and CVV from sites' own payment forms (hosted payment iframes were out of reach)
\- grabbed non-HttpOnly cookies and html2canvas screenshots
\- served the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits to older iOS versions

About $7,040 in crypto hit the attacker's wallets. The number of cards taken is unknown.

The CSP findings are the bit I think most web teams should look at:
\- 68 affected sites had no CSP at all
\- 50 had a CSP that let the payload run and send data out
\- 17 let it run but blocked the data leaving, thanks to connect-src
\- 24 (15%) blocked it completely

Allow-listing cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because that's where the malware came from. 'unsafe-eval' let an inline fallback copy run at HSBC even though the attacker's domain was blocked. A tight connect-src was the setting that actually stopped the theft.

Curious how others handle this. Do you run CSP in enforce mode with vendors like Optimizely or tag managers, or have you given up and gone report-only?


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Optimizely Experimentation compromise: loader served from Optimizely’s CDN to visitors of 178 orgs (wallet swapping, card skimming, iOS exploit kits

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 1d ago

🔎 HOW TO CHECK IF YOUR WEBSITE IS VULNERABLE If your organisation uses Optimizely Web Experimentation

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0 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Part 2: The FBI seized their network. Three weeks earlier, their proxyware had already moved into a new app.

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Help/Question security topics worth discussing with the company wide employees during this dark times

1 Upvotes

There is just a lot going on in the cyber space kindly advise


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Help/Question Can agent swarms work from stale evidence?

1 Upvotes

Only just realised this could be an issue.

We were discussing agent swarms in SecOps, with one agent testing controls and another reviewing SIEM detections. The idea was to let them run overnight and check the results later. CrowdStrike's SOC agents and Cymulate Cowork's agent squads for security testing got me thinking about what happens when things change mid-run:

  • first agent runs an attack test
  • someone updates the SIEM rule
  • next agent reviews the old result

The result made sense when the test ran, but the rule has changed. Now the swarm could report a detection gap that's already been fixed. I assume there's some way to catch stale results, but what if a rule changes halfway through and nobody kicks off a new test? Has anyone run into this with agents handing work back and forth?


r/threatintel • • 1d ago

Threat eMail Database

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1 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 2d ago

ARTEX Traffic - Previdian Threat Intelligence Report November 2026

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5 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 2d ago

ClickFix lures, from blockchain contract to pasted command

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1 Upvotes

We're now sharing over 240 blockchain contracts and 380 unique clickfix commands and the hosts they decide to on ohey every day.


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

November 16 | 24h Recap: AI credential hunting, Cursor extension compromise and Copeland exploitation attempts

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1 Upvotes

Three findings from today’s reading, with details worth checking:

  1. AI credential hunting: Amazon’s decoys captured agent records describing key theft from exposed LiteLLM, Dify and similar services, followed by reuse of those keys to power further operations. Amazon could not independently verify every outcome recorded by the agents.
  2. Cursor extension compromise: Cursor traced October’s incident to a key exposed through Fireworks. Tampered Claude Code versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 attempted SSH persistence. For affected installations, check for the svc-telemetry SSH key and associated startup scripts; removing the extension alone may leave artifacts behind.
  3. Copeland XWEB EVO exploitation: VulnCheck observed attempts against CVE-2026-124014 and CVE-2026-124010, affecting older firmware. The first configuration-write attempts arrived about 100 minutes after the CVE record appeared, before a public PoC was available.

Full recap on Cyber Recaps website.


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

CVE Discussion SSHole (CVE-2026-123158): The Story Behind the OpenSSH Authentication Bypass

1 Upvotes

https://youtu.be/J6LE3SDPjzI

A deep dive video into the history behind the vulnerability, how musl and OpenSSH interact, why two authentication attempts are needed, and how attackers exploit it.

https://youtu.be/J6LE3SDPjzI


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

Thanks to all who signed up for Free CTI so far!

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1 Upvotes

Was surprised by how many people signed up and from so many different industries, too!

Metrics so far: over a six-day period, a properly configured Free CTI workspace averaged 10 threat intelligence briefs out of the 268 threat reports collected by the system. That's 96.27% noise reduction (roughly ~4 hours a day) saved if you had to otherwise manually read all those reports.

If you signed up, thank you. I would appreciate any feedback so far, even if just a short one, sent to our email.

If you are planning to sign up, I would ask that you please update your monitoring scope (especially your industry) as soon as possible, since this will save me AI token cost and also let the tool curate the intelligence briefs properly for you!


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

We audited ARTEX, the AI pentest framework from the FBI FLASH. Its two safety controls don't do what their labels say

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1 Upvotes

ARTEX has been showing up a lot lately. CrowdStrike, Microsoft and TrendAI have all mentioned it in reporting, last week's FBI FLASH covered it, and Censys counted around 1,465 exposed consoles. Most of the coverage so far has been about who's using it. We wanted to look at how it's actually built.

We took the public Global Edition fork, pinned it to a specific commit (v0.3.15-global.1, d6964594) and reviewed the source boundary by boundary. We didn't stop at reading the code. We confirmed every finding live in an isolated VM, using a loopback marker service as the only target. We also wrote a small Go harness that calls ARTEX's own gate functions directly, so you can see exactly what each control allows or blocks without any agent or network noise.

What stood out:

- The scope blacklist only applies when assets are written to the graph. Execution tools like Bash, WebFetch, custom command tools and MCP tools never check it. We added a rule blocking 127.0.0.1, and a custom curl tool still reached the host.

- The approval gate only covers 8 built-in tool names. Anything outside that list is allowed before any rules run.

- The same HTTP DELETE got denied through Bash and went through when we wrapped it in a custom tool.

- The recording proxy is an open HTTP/CONNECT proxy with no auth. The binary and compose file keep it on loopback, but the Docker image binds 0.0.0.0:8788. So a plain -p mapping turns it into a pivot.

- We also found a few medium issues: argument injection through values starting with -, an agent shell that can read /proc/self/environ, and a self-updater that relies on an unsigned SHA256SUMS file.

We tested the auth layer just as hard, and it held up. There's no default password, forged JWTs failed, and path and verb tricks didn't work. None of this is a remote compromise of the tool itself. The problems are insecure defaults and controls sitting in the wrong place, and that pattern applies to a lot of agent frameworks beyond ARTEX.

For defenders, the post includes host, network and exposure indicators (ports, CA file path, DB table, User-Agents). Each one comes with a note on how reliable it is, so you're not blocking on a User-Agent alone.

Full write-up: https://ctiacademy.io/blog/artex-ai-pentest-framework-security-audit

If anyone has run into it in the wild, we'd like to hear what you saw.


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

OSINT Cybersec breaking news Telegram and WhatsApp channel

0 Upvotes

Hey everyone,

I created a Telegram and a WhatsApp channel that uses a local AI model to aggregate and summarize top cybersecurity news sources.

Automated with a n8n workflow and a tiny local ollama model (qwen2.5:3b) running on my 2GB 10 years old GPU :)

You can get quick notifications on your phone with the main points of every news piece:

  • Instant summaries: The actual essence of each news story.
  • Key threat intel: Critical CVEs, major breaches, and urgent patch updates summarized in seconds. Includes links to CVEs, KEV (if available), and CVSS scores.

This allows you to check in a glimpse whether you actually need to read the full article.

I started with a Telegram channel, but since WhatsApp is what everybody uses, I had to struggle with it but managed to automated it with WPP Connect.

I keep it restricted to a few select sources to avoid too many notifications, but even so, some days get busy!

Building this has been quite educational, and I hope you find it as useful as I do. I found I tend to read the small summaries and check the CVE's much more than a regular news feed that forces me to open a page and look for the main issues.

This is a rather newbie project but If you need any tech details feel free to ask.


r/threatintel • • 2d ago

I can't patch: must I patch or take it offline?

0 Upvotes

Well, this is entirely up to understanding what you are looking at. Firstly, updating is generally the better base option, but there will be cases where it simply is not an option. Recently, in contact with an organization, they were impacted by some problematic findings for a server, business critical, and at the moment no upstream update available.

They could pre-merge the proposed update for the vulnerability, but that is in itself something that may introduce problems. So what remained here was to do a configuration review in the meantime. Each of the CVEs only applies under specific configurations, meaning if they could confirm a series of conditions are not present, they would be good.

In their specific case, they had the following challenges to address:

  • CVE-2026-15176: Only applicable if a location uses alias together with rewrite, and $request_filename is used in set, return or log_format.
  • CVE-2026-93479: Only applicable if a map block uses regex matching with captures that are used in root or a log format. This can’t be fully ruled out by configuration alone.
  • CVE-2026-95101: Only applicable if HTTP/3 is enabled (ENABLE_HTTP3=true / listen ... quic). Please pay extra attention here: if HTTP/3 is enabled, you are exposed by default. Mitigation is to disable HTTP/3.
  • CVE-2026-97629: Only applicable if a shared SSL session cache is used with session tickets enabled and no ssl_session_ticket_key file. nginx-proxy sets ssl_session_tickets off by default, so please confirm this hasn’t been changed.
  • CVE-2026-97205: Only applicable if both aio and ssi are enabled.

Meaning that they could ensure to stay safe, provided they turned some features off and confirmed others had not been turned on. This does not scale well to attempt for every system, but it does go to show that when patching is not an option, security may very well still be.

How do you handle unpatchable, business-critical systems in your environment? Have you ever had to rely on deep config reviews like this instead of pulling the plug, or is taking it offline a hard rule for your team?

TL;DR: When an upstream patch isn't available for a business-critical NGINX server, auditing specific directives and disabling vulnerable features can buy you time safely without taking the system offline.


r/threatintel • • 3d ago

Part 1: The file manager that was quietly renting out your internet connection

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2 Upvotes

r/threatintel • • 3d ago

CVE Discussion SIP2Shell - CVE-2026-116779

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1 Upvotes