r/threatintel • u/materialsec • 4h ago
APT/Threat Actor Follow-up to our North Korean IT-worker research: the other side of it is recruiters asking real employees to lend their identity
Between October 3 and November 6, 2026, we found eight North Korea-linked operators emailing roughly 38 employees at 13 organizations we monitor. They weren’t applying for jobs this time. They were the recruiters.
The pitch was the same in every version. Create an account on an AI-training platform. Complete the identity verification yourself. An offshore team does the actual work under that account, and you keep a share. The platforms named were DataAnnotation, Outlier, Handshake AI, Mercor, Snorkel, and AfterQuery. They’re legitimate platforms, and they aren’t the problem here. One email opened with ‘What if you could earn money even while you’re asleep?’ One recruiter put the whole arrangement as ‘You can just make the accounts and allow me to work on that.’
The packaging changed from sender to sender. Some promised $8,000 or $10,000 a month, with the recipient keeping 30% to 50%. One introduced himself as a senior full-stack and AI engineer in Singapore looking for a long-term collaborator. Another said his previous AI-training account was no longer active and he needed help getting access to new opportunities.
Some emails linked a Google Doc titled ‘Flexible Side-Income Opportunity.’ It read like an ordinary business proposal, with a team introduction, a list of platforms, earnings screenshots, a privacy policy, 30% of project revenue, a $150 monthly minimum, and a $50 referral bonus. It also explained why they needed someone: many of these platforms mainly accept US-based individuals and verify identity through services like Persona. Then it said ‘That’s why we’re seeking your collaboration.’ It laid out the split. The team finds the projects, prepares the applications, and does the work. The recruit creates the accounts and completes verification.
Nobody was asked for a password or a passport. The messages told people not to share those directly. They were asked to complete the verification themselves. If an identity can’t get past verification on its own, convince its owner to do that part.
We’ve been tracking North Korea-linked fake applicants, and fake identities are already central to that scheme. We can’t say from the emails alone what these accounts were used for. What they show is what recruiting real people to provide access to their identities can look like, and it may be one way operators source them.
If a version of this pitch has landed in your organization, what did it look like, and did anyone report it?