r/netsec • • 17d ago

r/netsec monthly discussion & tool thread

20 Upvotes

Questions regarding netsec and discussion related directly to netsec are welcome here, as is sharing tool links.

Rules & Guidelines

  • Always maintain civil discourse. Be awesome to one another - moderator intervention will occur if necessary.
  • Avoid NSFW content unless absolutely necessary. If used, mark it as being NSFW. If left unmarked, the comment will be removed entirely.
  • If linking to classified content, mark it as such. If left unmarked, the comment will be removed entirely.
  • Avoid use of memes. If you have something to say, say it with real words.
  • All discussions and questions should directly relate to netsec.
  • No tech support is to be requested or provided on r/netsec.

As always, the content & discussion guidelines should also be observed on r/netsec.

Feedback

Feedback and suggestions are welcome, but don't post it here. Please send it to the moderator inbox.


r/netsec • • 17d ago

Hiring Thread /r/netsec's Q4 2026 Information Security Hiring Thread

1 Upvotes

Overview

If you have open positions at your company for information security professionals and would like to hire from the /r/netsec user base, please leave a comment detailing any open job listings at your company.

We would also like to encourage you to post internship positions as well. Many of our readers are currently in school or are just finishing their education.

Please reserve top level comments for those posting open positions.

Rules & Guidelines

Include the company name in the post. If you want to be topsykret, go recruit elsewhere. Include the geographic location of the position along with the availability of relocation assistance or remote work.

  • If you are a third party recruiter, you must disclose this in your posting.
  • Please be thorough and upfront with the position details.
  • Use of non-hr'd (realistic) requirements is encouraged.
  • While it's fine to link to the position on your companies website, provide the important details in the comment.
  • Mention if applicants should apply officially through HR, or directly through you.
  • Please clearly list citizenship, visa, and security clearance requirements.

You can see an example of acceptable posts by perusing past hiring threads.

Feedback

Feedback and suggestions are welcome, but please don't hijack this thread (use moderator mail instead.)


r/netsec • • 16h ago

Java4Shell: Write once, RCE everywhere

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110 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 3h ago

Microsoft saw an AI offensive framework move from a public GitHub secret to Key Vault data in five minutes

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10 Upvotes

Microsoft’s report describes ARTEX being used for more than automated reconnaissance. The framework searched public repositories for cloud and AI-service credentials, authenticated as application identities, mapped Azure resources and retrieved additional secrets.

Failed API requests were followed within seconds by corrected methods or API versions. In at least one observed case, an agent moved from finding an application secret on GitHub to extracting Azure Key Vault data in five minutes.

The practical problem is less a new exploit than the speed at which a leaked credential can now be discovered, understood and used across connected services.


r/netsec • • 3h ago

The AI Repo Man: Exploiting Agentic AI Debt Collection Platforms

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5 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 1d ago

Phrack #73 is out

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120 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 1h ago

BOSSAI: a single operator’s 12-agent AI attack mesh that hit Taiwan’s emergency services (and 10 other countries)

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• Upvotes

Our Threat Research Unit tracked down a lone operator in Taiwan running a mesh of 12 AI agents - some abliterated/uncensored, some commercial - to conduct offensive campaigns across 11 countries. A few things that make this one stand out:

  • The operator built specialized agent roles: builders (Grok, Claude Code, Codex) handled infrastructure, while attackers (mainly an agent called Hermes, plus Cursor and others) scanned targets and ran exploits - all stitched together via 13 MCP servers wrapping tools like Kali, Ghidra, and sqlmap
  • Confirmed breaches hit universities and emergency-services systems, with exfiltrated medical data and PII - including a Taipei fire department’s patient-care records (ECG data, ambulance video, vitals) and a city’s 119 dispatch case records
  • Commercial models (Grok 4.5, MiniMax M3) consistently refused offensive requests and even lectured the operator on Computer Crime Act violations - forcing a pivot to locally-run abliterated models (DeepSeek, GLM, Qwen variants) for actual attack execution
  • The “offensive” models weren’t reliable either - one scanner hallucinated a critical RCE that didn’t exist, and over half of its high/critical findings turned out to be false positives
  • Weak OPSEC (reused branding, hardcoded API keys, a shared home IP hosting the attacker’s own legitimate side businesses) let TRU trace the whole operation back to a specific individual in Hualien City, Taiwan

This case is a clear example of what’s being classified as an “AI-augmented threat” (AAT), not quite a traditional APT, but a single person achieving APT-like reach across government, military, financial, and emergency-services targets by orchestrating AI agents instead of a human team.

Full writeup with the MCP toolchain breakdown, model-by-model refusal/jailbreak analysis, and IOCs is available here - https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/bossai-inside-the-ai-attack-mesh-that-targeted-taiwans-emergency-services/


r/netsec • • 1d ago

Gitea scope bypass found: a "public-only" token can reach the whole admin API, including creating a new site admin (CVE-2026-117635)

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81 Upvotes

We found a scope bypass where a Gitea access token restricted to public resources could do everything the admin API allows.

Gitea enforces “public only” on the normal API routes. So if you ask for a private org with that token and you get token scope is limited to public orgs.

But then if you ask /api/v1/admin/orgs for the same org with the same token, it returns it.

The restriction is enforced one route group at a time, and essentially the admin group never got a check. Because the admin API has no public subset to narrow to, the narrowing middleware wouldn't have helped either. What was missing was the check for an outright reject.

A public-only token with write:admin, issued from a site-admin account, could:

  • list every private org and every user’s email
  • create a user and promote it to site admin
  • mint Actions runner registration tokens

If you self-host Gitea, upgrade to v28.3.0. Then check your site-admin list and your Actions runners for anything you don’t recognize.

Takeaway for any API with scoped tokens: when the scope is checked per route group, look for the groups that never call the check. Also look for groups that call a check with nothing to restrict.

(Gitea’s fix attaches the scope to the authenticated user instead, so no route group has to remember it.)

If you're interested the full write-up is here: https://escape.tech/blog/escape-research-found-a-scope-bypass-that-made-gitea-s-restricted-tokens-full-admins-it-s-now-cve-2026-117635/

Full disclosure: I work at Escape, the team that did the research.


r/netsec • • 1d ago

Discussion Glasswing overwhelms maintainers with underwhelming findings (VulnCheck)

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62 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 1d ago

Introducing ForgePtr (CVE-2026-47501): from unprivileged process (neighbor) to root on the host (landlord) for GPU clouds...

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10 Upvotes

It's an NVIDIA GPU Driver LPE. (Not connected to infidelity or nation state honey-potting of tech execs)

It's scored as CVSS 7.8, a “local” bug. We think it's worthwhile though considering LPEs in light of neoclouds / rentable sliced GPUs. After all, in a multi-tenanted environment, local means everyone paying to be there.

In our write up we also walk through how configs can be neutered, including Secure Boot.

TLDR - the bug allows attackers are to rent their way to accessing someone else’s production AI on vulnerable drivers.

The bug's been in the open-source driver for 4+ years, though is now patched following our responsible vulnerability disclosure process. Big thanks to the NVIDIA PSIRT team.


r/netsec • • 1d ago

Ethersphere postmortem: bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 shipped the same loader via a compromised release bot

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2 Upvotes

npm pulled bee-js@13.3.0 about 75 minutes after it was published. The same release bot had also shipped Swarm Desktop v0.56.2, and that build stayed the latest GitHub release for nearly eight more hours. Its macOS build was signed and notarized under the project's own Developer ID. I found it by following the bot's identity across the org instead of stopping at the npm package. At 03:26 UTC I posted the release, the commit, the loader and a containment list in the triage thread: https://github.com/ethersphere/bee-js/issues/1295#issuecomment-6731497299


r/netsec • • 1d ago

Sign2Shell: How We Hacked Every Major Brazilian Signature Extension

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5 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 6d ago

OWASP Top 10 Neocloud and AI Data Center Security Risks project released

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85 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 6d ago

prepared statements prevents SQLi. But it also helped me to exploit a 22 years old PostgreSQL 0-day RCE (CVE-2026-6460)

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58 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 6d ago

Contains AI How we defended against an AI-driven ARTEX attack

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44 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 6d ago

Contains AI NvRoot (CVE-2026-47591) where in neocloud multi-tenant GPU environments, rent = root. Essentially it's a dirty page cache LPE using GPUs as catalyzer

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22 Upvotes

From unprivileged user to root. Most dangerous for those renting multi-tenanted GPU from a neocloud.

Fixed versions: NvRoot in 610.57.04 / 595.91.07 / 580.178.04

no sysctl or seccomp workaround.

Disclaimer: I work at Stealthium, alongside the team that found these. Happy to answer questions on exposure


r/netsec • • 6d ago

History of Password Cracking

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41 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 7d ago

2.4% of AFRINIC’s IPv4 addresses answer from outside Africa, and about 81% of those sit in one company’s four blocks

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122 Upvotes

I work at IPinfo and this one started with a simple question: if a registry says an address is African, is it actually in Africa?

This started as work for a paper by our research team (WHEREIS, IMC 2026). We tested it with ping times. Light in fiber only travels so far in a millisecond, so a fast reply puts a hard limit on how far away an address can be.

Most registries pass, but AFRINIC is the exception: 2.4% of the addresses we could measure answer from outside Africa. And about 81% of those are in just four blocks, held by one company.

What surprised me most while writing this is that the registries’ own files still list 98.6% of them as African. So anything that blocks or allows traffic by registry country gets these wrong.

The numbers are a minimum, and anycast is left out.


r/netsec • • 7d ago

ScriptBlock Smuggling - AMSI Evasion

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10 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 7d ago

New Kimsuki (APT-43) active infrastructure and campaign discovered

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2 Upvotes

Stormshield's Cyber Threat Intelligence team has uncovered the Trigram campaign, targeting the AI, blockchain, and logistics sectors across Europe and the United States.

  • The Bait: Threat actors impersonate 50 companies using fake job offers, invitations, and package tracking notifications to deliver an infostealer to victims.
  • Behind the Scenes: A dedicated platform enables the attackers to track the entire operation end-to-end, from the initial click to credential theft.

By correlating this data with research from Proofpoint, SafeDep and Genians, Stormshield attributes this campaign with high confidence to North Korea, as a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster and the Kimsuky group (APT-43).


r/netsec • • 8d ago

Cracking Server 2022 NTLMv1-SSP Hashes with Rainbow Tables

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39 Upvotes

A while back, I had released a blog showing that NTLMv1 downgrade attacks still work on Windows Server 2022! While it isn't a default setting, it's still a misconfiguration to potentially look for.

If a DC’s LmCompatibilityLevel is set to 0-2, you can coerce authentication, strip Extended Session Security (ESS), and obtain an NTLMv1-SSP hash that’s crackable with a rainbow table. :)

Blog: https://hunio.org/security/ntlmv1-ssp-cracking/


r/netsec • • 8d ago

Electron, we have a problem

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59 Upvotes

Many Electron apps auto-update without verifying signatures. Many also still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates. Together, that lets an attacker on your network install malware on your machine.

I've compiled a list of notable Electron apps, installed them in a lab, and test which still trust the eMudhra certs, compared to whether they verify update signatures.

You can find the full table of apps on my post.


r/netsec • • 8d ago

Supabase Security findings why RLS is only 25% of the issues

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6 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 8d ago

Kubernetes Non-Core Security Audit

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15 Upvotes

r/netsec • • 9d ago

IP snowshoeing under US .gov email via a whitelisted AmazonSES typo in SPF

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195 Upvotes

UPDATE: Livingston County, MI, has removed amzonses[.]com from its SPF record. It had been there since at least November 2023, and when we checked, it authorized 32,066 IPs to send email as milivcounty[.]gov Since our research on US government domains went public, several government organizations have made changes to their DNS. The City of Waynesboro, TN has fixed the typo in its MX record, and the private company’s homepage served under woosterar[.]gov has been taken down. The Alabama Legislature looks to have a fix in progress too.

I run a small email security consultancy and this is our research.

A typo of AmazonSES in US government DNS whitelisted 32,066 IPs to pass DMARC p=quarantine as milivcounty[.]gov, with the IP set rotating every 3-8 days.

Attackers are snowshoeing the IPs, and once they get listed by Abusix and Spamhaus, they rotate the SPF include chain.

Other AmazonSES typos in gov SPF are amasonses[.]com under pikevilleky[.]gov and amazones[.]com under townofkirkwood[.]gov.

There are also 40 other US Gov domains with dangling & abused NS (domain takeover), MX (mail interception), and DMARC (telemetry hijack) records.

Our team has registered 17 of these typos and expired domains, including one that had been in use for 20 years and only expired in August.

DNS vulnerabilities have been around for decades, but many US government orgs decided to skip the security guardrails when they had the chance, and now those old gaps are being exploited by the same technologies they missed.