r/netsec • u/APT-vs-BellyFAT • 22h ago
Ethersphere postmortem: bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 shipped the same loader via a compromised release bot
ethswarm.orgnpm pulled bee-js@13.3.0 about 75 minutes after it was published. The same release bot had also shipped Swarm Desktop v0.56.2, and that build stayed the latest GitHub release for nearly eight more hours. Its macOS build was signed and notarized under the project's own Developer ID. I found it by following the bot's identity across the org instead of stopping at the npm package. At 03:26 UTC I posted the release, the commit, the loader and a containment list in the triage thread: https://github.com/ethersphere/bee-js/issues/1295#issuecomment-6731497299
r/netsec • u/PriorPuzzleheaded880 • 1d ago
Gitea scope bypass found: a "public-only" token can reach the whole admin API, including creating a new site admin (CVE-2026-117635)
escape.techWe found a scope bypass where a Gitea access token restricted to public resources could do everything the admin API allows.
Gitea enforces “public only” on the normal API routes. So if you ask for a private org with that token and you get token scope is limited to public orgs.
But then if you ask /api/v1/admin/orgs for the same org with the same token, it returns it.
The restriction is enforced one route group at a time, and essentially the admin group never got a check. Because the admin API has no public subset to narrow to, the narrowing middleware wouldn't have helped either. What was missing was the check for an outright reject.
A public-only token with write:admin, issued from a site-admin account, could:
- list every private org and every user’s email
- create a user and promote it to site admin
- mint Actions runner registration tokens
If you self-host Gitea, upgrade to v28.3.0. Then check your site-admin list and your Actions runners for anything you don’t recognize.
Takeaway for any API with scoped tokens: when the scope is checked per route group, look for the groups that never call the check. Also look for groups that call a check with nothing to restrict.
(Gitea’s fix attaches the scope to the authenticated user instead, so no route group has to remember it.)
If you're interested the full write-up is here: https://escape.tech/blog/escape-research-found-a-scope-bypass-that-made-gitea-s-restricted-tokens-full-admins-it-s-now-cve-2026-117635/
Full disclosure: I work at Escape, the team that did the research.
r/netsec • u/ChrisAtStealthium • 1d ago
Introducing ForgePtr (CVE-2026-47501): from unprivileged process (neighbor) to root on the host (landlord) for GPU clouds...
stealthium.ioIt's an NVIDIA GPU Driver LPE. (Not connected to infidelity or nation state honey-potting of tech execs)
It's scored as CVSS 7.8, a “local” bug. We think it's worthwhile though considering LPEs in light of neoclouds / rentable sliced GPUs. After all, in a multi-tenanted environment, local means everyone paying to be there.
In our write up we also walk through how configs can be neutered, including Secure Boot.
TLDR - the bug allows attackers are to rent their way to accessing someone else’s production AI on vulnerable drivers.
The bug's been in the open-source driver for 4+ years, though is now patched following our responsible vulnerability disclosure process. Big thanks to the NVIDIA PSIRT team.
r/netsec • u/acorn222 • 1d ago
Sign2Shell: How We Hacked Every Major Brazilian Signature Extension
amibeingpwned.comr/netsec • u/sonicLodge91 • 1d ago
Discussion Glasswing overwhelms maintainers with underwhelming findings (VulnCheck)
lwn.netr/netsec • u/Pale_Fly_2673 • 5d ago
OWASP Top 10 Neocloud and AI Data Center Security Risks project released
owasp.orgr/netsec • u/ChrisAtStealthium • 6d ago
Contains AI NvRoot (CVE-2026-47591) where in neocloud multi-tenant GPU environments, rent = root. Essentially it's a dirty page cache LPE using GPUs as catalyzer
stealthium.ioFrom unprivileged user to root. Most dangerous for those renting multi-tenanted GPU from a neocloud.
Fixed versions: NvRoot in 610.57.04 / 595.91.07 / 580.178.04
no sysctl or seccomp workaround.
Disclaimer: I work at Stealthium, alongside the team that found these. Happy to answer questions on exposure
prepared statements prevents SQLi. But it also helped me to exploit a 22 years old PostgreSQL 0-day RCE (CVE-2026-6460)
mehmetince.netr/netsec • u/Far_Ice2481 • 6d ago
Contains AI How we defended against an AI-driven ARTEX attack
labs.eye.security2.4% of AFRINIC’s IPv4 addresses answer from outside Africa, and about 81% of those sit in one company’s four blocks
ipinfo.ioI work at IPinfo and this one started with a simple question: if a registry says an address is African, is it actually in Africa?
This started as work for a paper by our research team (WHEREIS, IMC 2026). We tested it with ping times. Light in fiber only travels so far in a millisecond, so a fast reply puts a hard limit on how far away an address can be.
Most registries pass, but AFRINIC is the exception: 2.4% of the addresses we could measure answer from outside Africa. And about 81% of those are in just four blocks, held by one company.
What surprised me most while writing this is that the registries’ own files still list 98.6% of them as African. So anything that blocks or allows traffic by registry country gets these wrong.
The numbers are a minimum, and anycast is left out.
r/netsec • u/StormshieldArgos • 7d ago
New Kimsuki (APT-43) active infrastructure and campaign discovered
stormshield.comStormshield's Cyber Threat Intelligence team has uncovered the Trigram campaign, targeting the AI, blockchain, and logistics sectors across Europe and the United States.
- The Bait: Threat actors impersonate 50 companies using fake job offers, invitations, and package tracking notifications to deliver an infostealer to victims.
- Behind the Scenes: A dedicated platform enables the attackers to track the entire operation end-to-end, from the initial click to credential theft.
By correlating this data with research from Proofpoint, SafeDep and Genians, Stormshield attributes this campaign with high confidence to North Korea, as a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster and the Kimsuky group (APT-43).
r/netsec • u/1thirteenthirtyseven • 7d ago
Supabase Security findings why RLS is only 25% of the issues
oneleet.comCracking Server 2022 NTLMv1-SSP Hashes with Rainbow Tables
hunio.orgA while back, I had released a blog showing that NTLMv1 downgrade attacks still work on Windows Server 2022! While it isn't a default setting, it's still a misconfiguration to potentially look for.
If a DC’s LmCompatibilityLevel is set to 0-2, you can coerce authentication, strip Extended Session Security (ESS), and obtain an NTLMv1-SSP hash that’s crackable with a rainbow table. :)
r/netsec • u/pascalschaerli • 8d ago
Electron, we have a problem
schaerli.orgMany Electron apps auto-update without verifying signatures. Many also still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates. Together, that lets an attacker on your network install malware on your machine.
I've compiled a list of notable Electron apps, installed them in a lab, and test which still trust the eMudhra certs, compared to whether they verify update signatures.
You can find the full table of apps on my post.
r/netsec • u/PlasmaJam • 9d ago
IP snowshoeing under US .gov email via a whitelisted AmazonSES typo in SPF
sh.consultingUPDATE: Livingston County, MI, has removed amzonses[.]com from its SPF record. It had been there since at least November 2023, and when we checked, it authorized 32,066 IPs to send email as milivcounty[.]gov Since our research on US government domains went public, several government organizations have made changes to their DNS. The City of Waynesboro, TN has fixed the typo in its MX record, and the private company’s homepage served under woosterar[.]gov has been taken down. The Alabama Legislature looks to have a fix in progress too.
I run a small email security consultancy and this is our research.
A typo of AmazonSES in US government DNS whitelisted 32,066 IPs to pass DMARC p=quarantine as milivcounty[.]gov, with the IP set rotating every 3-8 days.
Attackers are snowshoeing the IPs, and once they get listed by Abusix and Spamhaus, they rotate the SPF include chain.
Other AmazonSES typos in gov SPF are amasonses[.]com under pikevilleky[.]gov and amazones[.]com under townofkirkwood[.]gov.
There are also 40 other US Gov domains with dangling & abused NS (domain takeover), MX (mail interception), and DMARC (telemetry hijack) records.
Our team has registered 17 of these typos and expired domains, including one that had been in use for 20 years and only expired in August.
DNS vulnerabilities have been around for decades, but many US government orgs decided to skip the security guardrails when they had the chance, and now those old gaps are being exploited by the same technologies they missed.
r/netsec • u/utku1337 • 10d ago